The response of Laurent Gbagbo to electoral
defeat was predictable. Indeed, the only
surprising aspect of the elections in Ivory Coast
was that he failed to manipulate the polls
sufficiently to ensure victory.
Ivory Coast was the case study I used to illustrate
the problems of political violence and electoral
manipulation in my recent book Wars, Guns and
Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. As I
pointed out there, despite his decade of power,
Gbagbo has never been in a position to win an
election conducted freely and fairly. Presumably,
he lost sight of this obvious point, succumbing to
the over-confidence which is the achilles heel of
long-tenured autocrats surrounded by
sycophants.
After the supine response of southern Africa's
governments to Mugabe, Gbagbo must be
astonished by what has hit him: West African
governments have been united, clear and tough.
Following their lead, the international community
has also behaved creditably. Nevertheless,
Gbagbo is still in power, albeit circumscribed. The
question now is how to oust him.
As President Outtara said recently, Gbagbo will
only step down in the face of force, or the
credible threat of force. Where is such force to be
found? The governments of West Africa are
discussing the mustering of a regional military
force to mass on the border of Ivory Coast, and
this could prove effective. The international
community should be ready to assist such a
military operation with finance and logistics.
But there is an alternative, much less demanding
approach along the lines I suggested in my book.
That is to generate a credible threat of force from
the government's own army. In much of Africa,
the national army is the force most feared by
presidents. Leaders go to considerable lengths to
keep the army happy, but coups are still
common. Because neither African governments
nor the international community want to
encourage coups, they have taken the line that
the military should simply stay out of politics at all
costs. This is understandable, but misguided: it's
better to set guidelines as to the very limited
circumstances under which the ousting of an
incumbent ruler would be legitimate.
Gbagbo's attempt to remain in power, recognised
as illegitimate by the regional authorities, is such
an instance. Of course, Gbagbo has taken care to
get the army onside: currently it is keeping him in
power. But his control of the army is inevitably
fragile. Were army officers requested by regional
authorities – supported by the international
community and Outtara – to remove Gbagbo in
an orderly fashion, his position might start to look
precarious. After all, a coup can come from
many different levels in the military hierarchy.
It is the senior officers who are closest to
Gbagbo, but they would know that a coup from
lower-ranking officers would spell their own
doom – and that lower-ranking officers would
find this an attractive strategy for accelerating
their careers. If junior officers ousted Gbagbo,
their reward would not be an unstable and high-
risk presidency, but secure senior military
positions.
Therefore, senior army officers might find it safer
to pre-empt such a risk, while quietly being
reassured by Outtara that they would keep their
positions. Gbagbo himself would be able to work
all this out. He would see that since the officer
core had an incentive to oust him that he could
not credibly counter, it would be safer to settle for
a lucrative exile.
As a result of international smart sanctions,
Gbagbo will realise there is an important
difference between exile after being ousted
through an internationally sanctioned coup, and a
voluntary exile as part of an agreed package. As
an affluent exile, he needs to be able to access his
foreign bank accounts: they are currently frozen
and will remain so unless he reaches a
settlement. Hence, I'd suggest supplementing
regional sabre-rattling with the encouragement of
action by the national army.
While getting Gbagbo out is now the key
objective, the ethnic divisions underlying the
Ivorian election, which are typical of Africa, raise
deeper issues. Rule by the majority breaks down
if it implies permanent exclusion of some groups
from power.
Nigeria has developed a reasonable de facto
constitutional solution: the alternation of power
between the major ethnic groups. The
democratic contest is then limited to a choice as
to whom, within the ethnic group whose turn it
is, should be president. Kenya may find a similar
approach helpful: the one decent Kenyan election
occurred when, by chance, both candidates were
Kikuyu.
Alternating power turns governance into a
"repeat play" game. One of the robust results of
game theory is that such games generally
produce satisfactory outcomes: conduct while in
power is disciplined by the strategy of tit-for-tat.
If one ethnic group abuses its turn in power, if
can anticipate that the other ethnic group will do
the same when it is next in power. Typically,
players quickly learn that they do best be using
their turn for the common good. This, rather
than the frustrating attempts at "power-sharing",
might be Africa's way to functioning
democracies.
Source: Http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/11/ivory-coast-elections-laurent-gbagbo-ousting
defeat was predictable. Indeed, the only
surprising aspect of the elections in Ivory Coast
was that he failed to manipulate the polls
sufficiently to ensure victory.
Ivory Coast was the case study I used to illustrate
the problems of political violence and electoral
manipulation in my recent book Wars, Guns and
Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. As I
pointed out there, despite his decade of power,
Gbagbo has never been in a position to win an
election conducted freely and fairly. Presumably,
he lost sight of this obvious point, succumbing to
the over-confidence which is the achilles heel of
long-tenured autocrats surrounded by
sycophants.
After the supine response of southern Africa's
governments to Mugabe, Gbagbo must be
astonished by what has hit him: West African
governments have been united, clear and tough.
Following their lead, the international community
has also behaved creditably. Nevertheless,
Gbagbo is still in power, albeit circumscribed. The
question now is how to oust him.
As President Outtara said recently, Gbagbo will
only step down in the face of force, or the
credible threat of force. Where is such force to be
found? The governments of West Africa are
discussing the mustering of a regional military
force to mass on the border of Ivory Coast, and
this could prove effective. The international
community should be ready to assist such a
military operation with finance and logistics.
But there is an alternative, much less demanding
approach along the lines I suggested in my book.
That is to generate a credible threat of force from
the government's own army. In much of Africa,
the national army is the force most feared by
presidents. Leaders go to considerable lengths to
keep the army happy, but coups are still
common. Because neither African governments
nor the international community want to
encourage coups, they have taken the line that
the military should simply stay out of politics at all
costs. This is understandable, but misguided: it's
better to set guidelines as to the very limited
circumstances under which the ousting of an
incumbent ruler would be legitimate.
Gbagbo's attempt to remain in power, recognised
as illegitimate by the regional authorities, is such
an instance. Of course, Gbagbo has taken care to
get the army onside: currently it is keeping him in
power. But his control of the army is inevitably
fragile. Were army officers requested by regional
authorities – supported by the international
community and Outtara – to remove Gbagbo in
an orderly fashion, his position might start to look
precarious. After all, a coup can come from
many different levels in the military hierarchy.
It is the senior officers who are closest to
Gbagbo, but they would know that a coup from
lower-ranking officers would spell their own
doom – and that lower-ranking officers would
find this an attractive strategy for accelerating
their careers. If junior officers ousted Gbagbo,
their reward would not be an unstable and high-
risk presidency, but secure senior military
positions.
Therefore, senior army officers might find it safer
to pre-empt such a risk, while quietly being
reassured by Outtara that they would keep their
positions. Gbagbo himself would be able to work
all this out. He would see that since the officer
core had an incentive to oust him that he could
not credibly counter, it would be safer to settle for
a lucrative exile.
As a result of international smart sanctions,
Gbagbo will realise there is an important
difference between exile after being ousted
through an internationally sanctioned coup, and a
voluntary exile as part of an agreed package. As
an affluent exile, he needs to be able to access his
foreign bank accounts: they are currently frozen
and will remain so unless he reaches a
settlement. Hence, I'd suggest supplementing
regional sabre-rattling with the encouragement of
action by the national army.
While getting Gbagbo out is now the key
objective, the ethnic divisions underlying the
Ivorian election, which are typical of Africa, raise
deeper issues. Rule by the majority breaks down
if it implies permanent exclusion of some groups
from power.
Nigeria has developed a reasonable de facto
constitutional solution: the alternation of power
between the major ethnic groups. The
democratic contest is then limited to a choice as
to whom, within the ethnic group whose turn it
is, should be president. Kenya may find a similar
approach helpful: the one decent Kenyan election
occurred when, by chance, both candidates were
Kikuyu.
Alternating power turns governance into a
"repeat play" game. One of the robust results of
game theory is that such games generally
produce satisfactory outcomes: conduct while in
power is disciplined by the strategy of tit-for-tat.
If one ethnic group abuses its turn in power, if
can anticipate that the other ethnic group will do
the same when it is next in power. Typically,
players quickly learn that they do best be using
their turn for the common good. This, rather
than the frustrating attempts at "power-sharing",
might be Africa's way to functioning
democracies.
Source: Http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/11/ivory-coast-elections-laurent-gbagbo-ousting
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