VIENNA -- The head of the International Atomic
Energy Agency said Monday his organization
cannot be sure that Iran is not secretly working
on nuclear arms, in comments reflecting
disappointment with the collapse of talks between
Tehran and six world powers.
That meeting ended Saturday with the six failing
to persuade Iran to dispel fears of such covert
activity by allowing increased IAEA monitoring of
its nuclear programs - leaving the U.N. agency
short of applying all inspecting instruments it
says it should have a right to.
"Cooperation is not sufficient" by Iran, IAEA
Director General Yukiya Amano told The
Associated Press. "We cannot provide ...
assurance on the absence of (undeclared) nuclear
activities or the exclusively peaceful nature of all
the nuclear activities of Iran."
Expectations had been low for the Istanbul
meeting. So the six powers - the U.S., China,
Russia, Britain France and Germany - had avoided
too much emphasis on their main demand: an
end to uranium enrichment, as called for by the
U.N. Security Council.
Iran's enrichment program is of international
interest because the process can create both
nuclear fuel and fissile nuclear warhead material.
While Iran insists it wants to enrich uranium only
to run a nuclear reactor network, its nuclear
secrecy, refusal to accept fuel from abroad and
resistance to IAEA efforts to follow up on
suspicions of covert experiments with
components of a nuclear weapons program have
heightened concerns.
Despite four sets of U.N. sanctions Iran insists it
will never give up its right to enrich uranium.
Since it resumed the process four years ago, it
has amassed enough low-enriched material for
more than two bombs, should it choose to
enrich its uranium to weapons-grade levels.
Separately, it has amassed more than 40
kilograms (nearly 90 pounds) of higher-enriched
uranium, which would take less time to turn into
weapons grade material, should Iran decide to do
so.
Because of Iran's rejection of talks on enrichment,
Iran's interlocutors instead had come to the table
with more modest hopes, including seeking
concessions from Tehran as to what it was ready
to show IAEA inspectors.
The problem is less about monitoring facilities
and activities that Iran has declared to the agency
and more about concerns that the Islamic
Republic might be hiding other nuclear work and
denying the IAEA the right to search for them.
"We maintain knowledge on Iranian enrichment
activities and other nuclear activities which are
declared," Amano said. But, he said, "our
knowledge is limited to which we have the
access."
That would include the central Natanz enrichment
plant, where thousands of centrifuges churn out
material that Iran says it will use as reactor fuel
but which can also be reworked to make the core
of nuclear warheads. Remote cameras and on
site inspections are meant to make sure no
material is diverted for possible weapons use,
and IAEA officials say the agency is content with
its overview at Natanz.
The IAEA also has sufficient access to the Bushehr
reactor built with Russian help that is to go on line
later this year and the Isfahan uranium
conversion plant making gas feedstock that is
then enriched at Natanz.
But Tehran has restricted IAEA access to its
reactor site at Arak, which - once completed - will
be able to produce plutonium, which can also be
used to arm nuclear warheads.
And it revealed a nearly finished enrichment
facility at Qom in 2009 to the IAEA just days
before the U.S. and Britain went public with
intelligence on its existence, feeding concern that it
had planned to keep it secret and worry of other
undeclared nuclear work elsewhere.
"The facility at Qom was brought to our attention
at quite a late stage of construction," said Amano.
"We also hear from a high level of Iranian
authorities that they have plans of constructing
(other) enrichment plants, but we don't have
particular informations."
Such lack of transparency means that "we cannot
provide an assurance of the absence of
undeclared activities and facilities," said Amano.
Iran also refuses to cooperate with an IAEA probe
of U.S. and other intelligence reports that it
worked on nuclear weapons programs,
dismissing them as falsifications and asserting
that the agency is overstepping its bounds -
something Amano denied.
"We have the mandate to have clarification on
these issues," Amano said, citing U.N. Security
Council resolutions urging Iran to cooperate with
the agency on clearing up the allegations.
Source: Http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/01/24/2031731/ap-interview-iaea-critical-of.html
Energy Agency said Monday his organization
cannot be sure that Iran is not secretly working
on nuclear arms, in comments reflecting
disappointment with the collapse of talks between
Tehran and six world powers.
That meeting ended Saturday with the six failing
to persuade Iran to dispel fears of such covert
activity by allowing increased IAEA monitoring of
its nuclear programs - leaving the U.N. agency
short of applying all inspecting instruments it
says it should have a right to.
"Cooperation is not sufficient" by Iran, IAEA
Director General Yukiya Amano told The
Associated Press. "We cannot provide ...
assurance on the absence of (undeclared) nuclear
activities or the exclusively peaceful nature of all
the nuclear activities of Iran."
Expectations had been low for the Istanbul
meeting. So the six powers - the U.S., China,
Russia, Britain France and Germany - had avoided
too much emphasis on their main demand: an
end to uranium enrichment, as called for by the
U.N. Security Council.
Iran's enrichment program is of international
interest because the process can create both
nuclear fuel and fissile nuclear warhead material.
While Iran insists it wants to enrich uranium only
to run a nuclear reactor network, its nuclear
secrecy, refusal to accept fuel from abroad and
resistance to IAEA efforts to follow up on
suspicions of covert experiments with
components of a nuclear weapons program have
heightened concerns.
Despite four sets of U.N. sanctions Iran insists it
will never give up its right to enrich uranium.
Since it resumed the process four years ago, it
has amassed enough low-enriched material for
more than two bombs, should it choose to
enrich its uranium to weapons-grade levels.
Separately, it has amassed more than 40
kilograms (nearly 90 pounds) of higher-enriched
uranium, which would take less time to turn into
weapons grade material, should Iran decide to do
so.
Because of Iran's rejection of talks on enrichment,
Iran's interlocutors instead had come to the table
with more modest hopes, including seeking
concessions from Tehran as to what it was ready
to show IAEA inspectors.
The problem is less about monitoring facilities
and activities that Iran has declared to the agency
and more about concerns that the Islamic
Republic might be hiding other nuclear work and
denying the IAEA the right to search for them.
"We maintain knowledge on Iranian enrichment
activities and other nuclear activities which are
declared," Amano said. But, he said, "our
knowledge is limited to which we have the
access."
That would include the central Natanz enrichment
plant, where thousands of centrifuges churn out
material that Iran says it will use as reactor fuel
but which can also be reworked to make the core
of nuclear warheads. Remote cameras and on
site inspections are meant to make sure no
material is diverted for possible weapons use,
and IAEA officials say the agency is content with
its overview at Natanz.
The IAEA also has sufficient access to the Bushehr
reactor built with Russian help that is to go on line
later this year and the Isfahan uranium
conversion plant making gas feedstock that is
then enriched at Natanz.
But Tehran has restricted IAEA access to its
reactor site at Arak, which - once completed - will
be able to produce plutonium, which can also be
used to arm nuclear warheads.
And it revealed a nearly finished enrichment
facility at Qom in 2009 to the IAEA just days
before the U.S. and Britain went public with
intelligence on its existence, feeding concern that it
had planned to keep it secret and worry of other
undeclared nuclear work elsewhere.
"The facility at Qom was brought to our attention
at quite a late stage of construction," said Amano.
"We also hear from a high level of Iranian
authorities that they have plans of constructing
(other) enrichment plants, but we don't have
particular informations."
Such lack of transparency means that "we cannot
provide an assurance of the absence of
undeclared activities and facilities," said Amano.
Iran also refuses to cooperate with an IAEA probe
of U.S. and other intelligence reports that it
worked on nuclear weapons programs,
dismissing them as falsifications and asserting
that the agency is overstepping its bounds -
something Amano denied.
"We have the mandate to have clarification on
these issues," Amano said, citing U.N. Security
Council resolutions urging Iran to cooperate with
the agency on clearing up the allegations.
Source: Http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/01/24/2031731/ap-interview-iaea-critical-of.html
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